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REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
1993/2 — Éditions BRUYLANT, Bruxelles

GULF WAR COMPENSATION STANDARD :
CONCERNS UNDER THE CHARTER
BY

Rex J. ZEDALIS (*)

I.

In an essay on the burning of the Kuwaiti oilflelds and the doctrine of
military necessity, which appeared two years ago in the pages of the
Review (1), I alluded to a fascinating question regarding the United
Nations’ authority to fïx war claims liability on Iraq simply because of that
country’s culpability in initiating the August 1990 unlawful invasion and
occupation of the sheikdom of Kuwait (2). The appropriateness of returning
to that question seems demonstrated by the recent literature on the newly
formed post-Gulf War U.N. Compensation Commission (3). Some of that
literature makes clear that paragraph 8 of Resolution 674 (4), and paragraph 16 of Resolution 687 (5), the two controlling Security Council pronouncements, are interpreted by thoughtful scholars as resting liability
solely on the illegality of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of its tiny neighbor to the southeast (6). As one commentator has put it, Iraqi « [ljiability ...exists even in cases where the individual act of an Iraqi agent, taken
in isolation, would not constitute a violation of international law. » (7)
Given that the Security Council Resolutions referenced above speak in

(*) Director, Comparative and International Law Center, and Professor of Law, University
of Tulsa ; Cutting Fellow in International Law (1980-81) and J.S.D. (1987), Columbia University.
(1) Z e d a l i s , «Military Necessity and Iraqi Destruction o f Kuwaiti Oil», 1990/2 Revue Belge
de Droitlnternational 333.
(2) Id. at 334, note 17.
(3) See G a b m î s e , «The Iraqi Claims Process and the Ghost o f Versailles », 67 N.Y.U . L. Rev.
840 (1992) ; C r o o k , « The United Nations Compensation Commission — — A New Structure to
Enforcé State Responsibility », 87 Am. J. In t’l L. 144 (1993).
(4) SC Res. 674 (Oct. 29, 1990), reprinted in 29 Irit'l L. Mat. 1561 (1990).
(5) SC Res. 687 (Spr. 3, 1991), reprinted in 30 In t’l L. Mai. 846 (1991).
(6) See C r o o k , swpra note 3 at 147 (« the key causal factor giving rise to responsibility is the
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait»).
(7) Id. On Crook’s familiarity with the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal see C r o o k , «Applicable
Law in International Arbitration : The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Expérience», 83 Am. J. Int'l
L. 278 (1989).
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terms of liability for loss, damage, or injury « as a result of » (8) the invasion
and occupation, there would seem ample support for the view that the
determining standard stresses automatic liability because of Iraq’s illégal
aggression, not because each discrete claim involves an act or omission
inconsistent with some spécifié principle of international law relative to
armed combat.
Clearly, it would not be à radical departure from the historical practice
regarding war claims to find that, siniply as a resuit of the aggressive war
against Kuwait, Iraq has been fixed with liability for the injurious consé
quences thereof (9). In many many cases, war claims have been settled in
accordance with political, moral, or economic considérations alone (10).
Occasionally, though, settlement has taken into accourit whether the claims
have been ba,sed on individual showings of violations of précisé rules of
international law governing the prosecution o f combat, or have been affected by the presence of legally recognized exculpatory circumstances insulating the state against which the claim is made (11). What is so intriguing
about the Security Council Résolutions dealing with Iraq concerns the
extent to which the UN is empowered to set to one side issues of internatio
nal law in the actual conduct of the hostilities, and impose liability on the
basis o f nothing more than the illegality o f the original invasion and occu
pation. Much may exist in the practice of states to suggest war claims have
been settled in accordance with such an approach in the past. But do the
provisions of the Charter itself envision the United Nations being vested
with authority to replicate such practice and fix liability without reference
to the laws governing the actual behavior of armed forces following the ini
tiation of an illégal war of aggression ?

II.
Of the more général provisions in the UN Charter bearing upon the issue
of the Security Council’s power to fix war claims liability without regard
to the laws and customs of warfare, points three and six of the Preamble
(8) SC Res. 674, para. 8, swpra note 4, states it « [rjeminds Iraq that under international law
it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, ..., as a
resuit of the invasion and illégal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. » SC Res. 687, para. 16, sv/pra
note 5, provides the Security Council « [r]eaffirms that Iraq, ..., is liable under international law
for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural
resources, or injury ...as a resuit of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. »
(9) As to the scope of liability, para. 8 of SC Res. 674, id., speaks iii terms of liability for
« any » loss, damage or injury, but para. 16 of SC Res. 687, id., confines liability to « any direct »
loss, damage, or injury.
(10) See generally Y a t e s , « State Responsibility for Nonwealth Injuries to Aliens i in Interna
tional Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 211, 256 (R. Lillich éd., 1983). H a n n a ,
«Légal Liability for War Damage», 43 Mich. L. Rev. 1057 (1945).
(11) See generally W. B i s h o p , International Law : Cases and Materials 797-98 (Bd. ed. 1971)
(discussing examples where no treaty of peace was concèmed).
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are relevant. In expressing the world community’s détermination to « establish conditions under which ...respect for the obligations ...arising
from ...international law can be maintained, » (12) point three evidences a
high degree of focus on the connection between international standards and
their observance by the UN itself. This détermination is then followed by
the point’s indication the community therefore aims at avoiding the use of
force by « ensur[ing] ...the acceptance o f principles .... » (13) Since there is
no serious dispute about the significance of the Charter’s Preamble in
understanding the authority possessed by the organs of the United Nations
and the ways that authority can be exercised (14), the references in points
three and six to «respect for ...international law» and «the acceptance of
principles » could well operate to constrain the Security Council’s ability to
provide for war claims compensation without regard to the rules governing
the conduct o f armed combat. If the allusion to « international law » signi
fies a commitment by the UN to honor established international rules, then
the drafters of the Charter may have bound the Security Council to the
limitations that war claims be based on violations o f the laws of war (15).
Similarly, in the event the drafters’ goal in point six of «ensur[ing] ...the
acceptance o f principles >> reveals a firm dedication to actions consonant
with controlling légal norms, then the Charter may oblige the organs envisioned by it to consider, and not ignore, standards which speak in terms
of compensation payable for acts of combat deemed reprehensible (16). One
might view the pattern of settling claims following the two world wars this
century as providing some support for the interprétation suggested. Indeed,
in the opening point of the Charter’s Preamble the drafters specifïcally
recalled the « scourge of war which twice in [their] lifetime ...brought untold
sorrow ... » to the community of nations (17). To be sure, the settlements in

(12) See U.N. Charter, Preamble, point three, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, reading :
We The Peoplea Of The United Nations Determined
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.
(13) Id., point six, reading :
And For These Ends
save in the common interest. ...
(14) See L. G o o d r i c h , E. H a m b r o and A. S i m o n s , Charter of the United Nations : Commentary Documents 20-21 (3d rev. ed. 1969).
(15) See e.g., Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
article 3, 36 Stat. 2277 at 2290, 1 Bevans 631 at 640 (réparations to be paid for violations of
annexed Régulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land).
(16) Id. Though it might be possible for one to maintain the reference to « international law »
and « principles » include the law and principles evidenced in past war claim settlements (which
basically support imposed réparations without regard to the laws of war), binding law and prin
ciples would only seem to emerge from something other than expedient, self-interested action.
See C. d e V i s s c h e r , Theory and Reality in Public IntematioTuü Law, 48-50 (P. Corbett trans.
1957).
(17) See U.N. Carter, supra note 12 at Preamble, point one.
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both cases envisaged the defeated powers paying réparations to the victors.
Nonetheless, it is clear that what emerged from World War II was much
more lenient than what had been imposed on Germany following the first
World War.
World War I left 8 million soldiers killed, 22 million civilians killed or
wounded, and ineffable dévastation throughout the heàrt of Europe (18).
The so-called « réparation clauses » of the 1919 Treaty o f Versailles (19), the
central âgreement terminating the war(20), provided in articles 231-263 for
German « war guilt, » réparations for ail loss and damage resulting from the
aggression of Germany and her allies, and the création of a Réparation
Commission to determine the exact amount of German liability. The figure
initially set by the Commission was 132 billion German marks (21), then
equivalent to about $ 30 billion (22), to be pàid at scheduled intervais. As
one distinguished commentator has put it, the idea was to « tum [Germany]
into a nation of exportera organized for the purpose of paying .. .réparation
claims .... » (23) In the end, the punitive and unrealistic nature of the répa
ration figure necessitated révision (24) and resulted in only a very small
portion of the original amount ever being paid (25). It seems, however, Ger
many regarded its treatment over réparations with indignation, and such
played a rôle in developments that led to the ascendancy of Nazism and
the outbreak of World War II (26).

(18) See C. M e e , Jr., The End of Order xvii (1980) ; and The Réparation Seulement, World
Peace Foundation, vol. X II, no. 5 at 806 (1929).
(19) See generally Treaty o f Versailles, June 28, 1919, reprinted in B. B a r u c h , The Mahing
of the Réparation and Economie Sections of the Treaty (1970).
(20) The other relevant treaties signed by the allies with the vanquished central powers and
comprising the WW I peace settlement were the Treaty of Saint Germain (Ausbria), Sept. 10,
1919 ; the Treaty of Trianon (Hungary), June 4, 1920 ; the Treaty of Neuilly (Bulgaria), Nov.
27, 1919 ; the Treaty of Sevres (Turkey), Aug. 10, 1920.
(21) See J. A n g e ï x , The Recovery of Germany 19 (1929).
(22) See R. F e r r e l l , American Diplomacy : A History 511 (2d ed. 1975) ($33 billion). On the
fact that the réparation amounts were seen as not tied to particular violations by Germany of
the laws o f war, see e.g., Opinion of March 25, 1924, U.S.-Germany Mixed Claims Comm'n 75-76,
excerpted in W. B is h o p , supra note 11 at 799.
(23) See B . B à r u c h , supra note 19 at 45.
(24) The first major révision occurred in 1923 with the Dawes Plan. See Décision No. 2720
of the Réparation Comm’n, Nov. 30, 1923, reprinted in 14 Allied Powers Réparation Comm'n Offi
cial Documents : The Experts ’ Plan for Réparation Payments 1 (1927) (on the création of the Committee that developed the Plan) and The Réparation Settlement, supra note 18 at 811 (on the
adoption o f the Plan). The second occurred in 1929 with the Young Plan. Seé « Report of the
Committee o f Experts on the Settlement of the Réparation Problem », June 7, 1929, reprinted
in 24 Am. J. Int’l L. (Official Documents) 81 (1930).
(25) See C. M e e , Jr. supra note 18 at 261 (suggesting that once one subtracts unpaid post-war
investments in Germany from réparations actually made, the net figure of réparations is « economically negligible »).
(26) See A.J.P. T a y l o r , The Origins of the Second World War 50 (1961) (discussing the psycho-political effects of réparations on the German public). Curiously, Adolph Hitler himself railed
against réparations in a section o f Mein Kampf entitled « The Diktat o f Versailles. » See The Ver
sailles Settlement : Was It Foredoomed To Failure ? 86 (I. Lederer, ed. 1960).
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The Second World War was far more devastating than the First. The
Nazis themselves exterminated close to 12 million civilians through deliberate means (27), Russia alone lost more than 6 million men (28), and the
total amount o f war claims against only Germany totaled nearly $300 bil
lion dollars (29), a figure ten times as large as that fïxed on that defeated
nation by the Versailles Treaty Réparation Commission (30). Yet the terms
of settlement with the Axis Powers were clearly more generous than those
imposed on Germany and her allies in 1919. The 1946 Paris Agreement on
Réparation (31), which implemented the 1945 Potsdam Déclaration (32),
basically exacted German réparations from existing external assets and
unnecessary internai industrial equipment (33). The idea was, in President
Truman’s words, to have «[Réparations this time ...paid in physical
assets ...not required for [Germany’s] peacetime subsistence, » (34) and in
the words of a U.S. State Department représentative, to avoid a réparation
program like « the World War I conception of réparation as the maximum
obtainable flnancial compensation in fixed sums o f money. » (35) Equally as
generous were the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy (36), and the 1951
Treaty of Peace with Japan (37). Both concentrated largely on réparations
from external assets, military factory and tool equipment not readily sus
ceptible to conversion to civilian purposes, and général industrial produc
tion, to the extent not interfering with economic reconstruction or imposing further pecuniary burdens on the Allies (38).
With the pattern of comparative leniency emerging from the war claims
settlements of W W II, the plaüsibility o f reading points three and six of
the Charter’s Preamble as continuing to elaborate on and further this deve
lopment certainly exists. As such, the référencés to « respect for internatio
nal law » and « acceptance of principles » are capable of being seen as rèstricting the power of the United Nations by requiring that ail of its actions
be consistent with established juridical norms. In the context of war claims,
(27) See H. M o r g e n t h a t j , Politics Among Nations : The Strugglefor Power and Peace 364 (5th
ed. 1973).
(28) See J. L u k a o s , A New History of the Cold War 4 (3d ed. 1966).
(29) See H o w ard , «The Paris Agreement on Réparation from Germany», 14 Dept. of State
Bull. 1023 (1946).
(30) See text accompanying supra note 22.
(31) See Final Act and Annex of the Paris Conference on Réparations, Jan. 14, 1946, reprin
ted in 40 Am. J. Int’l L. (Official Documents) 117 (1946).
(32) See Report of Tripartite Conference of Berlin, Reprinted in 39 Am. J. Int ’l L. (Official
Documents) 245 (1945).
(33) See d e V r ie s , « The International Responsibility of the United States for Vested German
Assets », 51 Am. J. In t’l L. 18, 20 (1957).
(34) See 13 Dept. of State Bull. 208, 210 (1945).
(35) H ow ard , supra note 29.
(36) Treaty of Peace, Feb. 10, 1947, reprinted in 42 Am. J. In t’l L. (Official Documents) 47
(1948).
(37) Treaty of Peace, Sept. 8, 1951, reprinted in 46 Am. J. In t’l L. 71 (1952).
(38) See e.g., Treaty o f Peace with Italy, supra note 36 at Part VI, sec. I ; Treaty of Peace
with Japan, supra note 37 at Chpt. Y.
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this would mandate settlement for violations of the laws o f war ; not for
ail loss, damage, or injury simply proceeding from an unlawful invasion
and occupation.
A major objection to this line of reasoning exists in the fact that the
UN Charter was drafted contemporaneously with the réparation settle
ments of the Second World War. It might be questioned how the
Preamble to the Charter could bé reâd as confîning UN imposed répara
tions to claims involving compensation for violations of the rules of war
when the nations that drew up the Charter’s terms were at roughly that
same time busy putting together treaties of peace calling for claims settle
ment without regard to transgressions of the laws and customs governing
the prosecution of combat. Surely, if the language of points three and six
of the Preamble have any meaning, it is the exact opposite of the restric
tive one suggested above. The contemporeneity o f the Charter and the set
tlements of WW II suggest the United Nations is not obligated to fashion
a system of réparations based only on conduct inconsistent with the laws
of armed warfare.
There would seem two problems with concluding that the drafting,
during the same time frame, of the peace treaties of the Second World
War and the Charter of the UN means the Preamble to the latter can be
interpreted as authorizing United Nations réparation schemes that ignore
the way war was prosecuted and focus only on whether its initiation was
capable of being characterized as unlawful aggression. The first has to do
with the fact the peace settlements o f World War II were backward-looking, designed to address international violence which had already occur
red and continued to evoke powerful émotions. The Charter, on the other
hand, was intended to be forward-looking, directed at securing future
world order through the articulation in peace time of principled coopéra
tive efforts. The second problem is that the WW II peace treaties reflected
the standards the individual Allies felt they were limited by after the
incredible losses they had been forced to endure. But the Charter was
aimed at limiting the power of a new international organ, an entity which
might act in ways completely unanticipated by its prime architects. Given
the appréhension associated with the création o f an organization able to
act for the entire community of nations, and the forward rather than
backward-looking character of its organic document, there certainly
appears ample reason to believe the roughly contemporaneous nature of
the Charter and the WW II settlements do not inexorably preclude interpreting the Charter’s Preamble as restricting UN réparation schemes to
claims arising out of particular acts violative of the laws o f warfare. Thus,
it may well be appropriate to find points three and six of the Preamble
as establishing limitations on the Security Council’s power to fashion the
standards for Gulf War claims.
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III.
Aside from the terms of the Preamble, articles 1 and 2 of the Charter,
stating the purposes and principles of the UN, contain language of relevance to the question of the Security Council’s power to establish a com
pensation plan imposing liability for claims arising from international
conflict. Those articles enter the équation by virtue of article 24, paragraph 2’s reference to the UN’s « Purposes and Principles. » (39) It will be
recalled that article 24 is part of that chapter in the Charter setting forth
the Security Councü’s fonctions and powers. The opening paragraph' of the
article indicates that the primary responsibility of the Council is the main
tenance of peace and security (40). It provides further that the Council « in
carrying out its duties under this responsibility » acts on behalf of the members of the UN (41). Then 24(2) follows by providing that in discharging
these duties the Council « shall act in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations. » (42)
Since it is incontrovertible that the Security Council in carrying out its
duties is thus required to act in accordance with the purposes and prin
ciples of articles 1 and 2, what exists in the terms of those provisions to
suggest a limitation on the Council’s power in fashioning a war compensa
tion plan ? Initially there is the language of article 1, paragraph 1, referencing the fact that a major purpose of the UN is the maintenance of peace
and security, and that purpose is to be secured by bringing about through
peaceful means the settlement of international disputes or situations «in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law. » (43) Then
there is article 2, paragraph 3’s reference to the fact that in pursuing this,
and other, purposes the UN is to act in accordance with the principle of
settling disputes so that «peace, security, and justice, are not endangered. » (44) Again, as with the Preamble, the terms international law, prin
ciples, and justice appear, this time in connection with 24(2)’s spécifié limi
tation on the Security Council’s power of action.
The significance and import of these references in terms of a check on the
Security Council is implied by several things. First, no similar sort o f restraint seems to have been imposed on the Security Council’s predecessor,
the Council of The League of Nations. Articles 11, 15, and 17 of the League
Covenant provided that war or threat of war was a concern of the League,
disputes likely to lead to a rupture between League members fell within the
jurisdiction of the Council, and disputes involving non-members could be
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)

U.N. Charter, supra note 12, art. 24(2).
Id. at art. 24(1).
Id.
Id. at art. 24(2).
Id. at art 1(1).
Id. at art. 2(3).
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brought within the Council’s jurisdiction by non-member acceptance of the
obligations of the Covenant (45). In each of these cases, the Council was
empowered to act. As the governing language of the provisions spoke only
of actions the Council deemed appropriate, it would appear its powers were
in theory quite vast (46). The use of the term « just » in paragraph 4 of
article 15 does not départ from this undérstanding since, unlike with the
Charter’s use of similar terms, it is clear the Covenant did not view justice
as an external limit on the power of the Council, but as a factor that was

(45) See The Covenant of the League o f Nations, as amended (1924), League o f Nations Doc.
No. C.L. 102.1926.V., arts. 11, 15, 17. Article 11 provided in relevant part :
1. Any war or threat o f war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League
or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take
any action that may be deemed wise and effectuai to safeguard the peace o f nations. In case any
such emergency should arise, the Secretary-General shall, on the request of any Member of the
League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.
Article 15 stated in part :
1. I f there should arise between Members o f the League any dispute likely to lead to a rup
ture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial seulement in accordance with Article 13,
the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party
to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the
Secretary General, who will make ail necessary arrangements for a full investigation and considé
ration thereof.
3. The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement o f the dispute, and if such efforts are
successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dis
pute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may seem appropriate.
4. I f the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote
shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recom
mendations which are deemed jùst and proper in regard thereto.
Article 17 noted :
1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a mem
ber o f the League or between States not members of the League, the State or States not members
of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the pur
poses o f such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is
accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications
as may be deemed necessary by the Council.
2. Upon such invitation being given, the Council shall immediately institute an enquiry into
the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effec
tuai in the circumstances.
3. I f a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations o f membership in the League
for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the
provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.
4. I f both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of members
hip in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and
make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will resuit in the settlement of the
dispute.
(46) Id. Article 11(1) speaks of «any action that may be deemed wise and effectuai»;
article 15(3) of « terms of settlement ...the Council may deem appropriate » and 15(4) of « recom
mendations ...deemed just and proper»; article 17(2) of «action as may seem best and most
effectuai » and 17(4) of « recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will resuit in the settle
ment of the dispute. »
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to be reflected in recommendations emerging from the Council’s exercise of
power under article 15 (47).
,
The second item indicating that the UN Charter’s references in arti
cles 1 and 2 to international law, principles, and justice are significant in
suggesting a check or limit on the power of the Security Council cornes
from the Charter’s early draft, the Dumbarton Oaks proposai (48).
Nowhere in chapter I, paragraph I, the predecessor o f Charter article 1(1),
nor chapter II, paragraph 3, the predecessor of article 2(3), do any of these
terms appear (49). In addressing the discharge by the Security Council of
its responsibilities, chapter VI, section B, paragraph 2 (50), the predecessor
of article 24(2), alludes to the Council being restricted by the purposes and
principles of the organization. But as those purposes and principles make
no reference of the sort incorporated in articles 1(1) and 2(3) of the Charter,
what seems to have been envisioned, at least in this respect, is an interna
tional body more akin to the League than to today’s United Nations.
The third and final thing suggesting that articles 1 and 2 rèally are signi
ficant as a check on how the Security Council exercises its powers, concems
the history behind the inclusion in paragraphs 1 and 3 of these respective
provisions of the Charter to the references to international law, principles,
and justice. On several occasions during the 1945 San Francisco Conference
on International Organization, proposais to include in article 1, para-

(47) There seems a qualitative différence between saying, as article 15(4) of the Covenant
does, that the League Council is to recommend dispute settlements «which are deemed just ... »,
and saying, as articles 1(1) and 24(2) of the Charter do, that the Security Council is to act in
accordance with the purpose of maintaining peace and security, and to that end is to bring about
peaceful settlements « in conformity with the principles o f justice and international law. » While
both indicate the settlement is to reflect justice (and international law), the Charter appears to
go further and establish justice (and international law) as a reflected condition, external to the
Security Council, which actually serves to set the bounds o f its authority. After ail, the Covenant
leaves it up to the Council to determine if its settlement is just. The Charter sets a much more
objective tone.
(48) See Proposais for the Establishment of a General International Organization (Dumbar
ton Oaks Proposai), Oct. 7, 1944, reprinted in 39 Am. J. Int’l L. (Official Documents) 42, 46
(1945).
(49) Id., at Chpt. I, para. 1, and Chpt. II, para. 3, reading, respectively :
The purposes o f the Organization should be :
1.
To maintain international peace and security ; and to that end to take effective collective
measures for the prévention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or
settlement o f international disputes which may lead to a breach o f the peace ;
In pursuit of the purposes mentioned in Chapter I the Organization and its members should
act in accordance with the following principles :
3.
Ail members o f the Organization shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security are not endangered.
(50) Id. at Chpt. VI, sec. B, para. 2.
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graph 1, reference to justice and international law were rejected (51). The
rejected proposais ail focused on inserting these terms in the opening phraseology of 1(1). This would have altered the basic purpose of the UN by
predicating the maintenance of peace and security on the concepts o f jus
tice and international law. As that phraseology stands, the maintenance of
peace and security is of suffïciently grave importance to remain free of any
encumbering condition. Had it been any other way, there is the possibility
the Charter may have admitted of interprétations increasing the freedom
of states to employ force to resolve acute différences o f policy (52). In the
end, justice and international law were incorporated in the language of
article 1(1) to guard against accommodations sacrificing the rights of small
states in the interest of peace (53). The exact spot where the terms were
ultimately placed, however, relegated them to the status of a limitation on
the power of the organs of the UN, most importantly the Security Council,
to adjust or settle perilous disputes or situations of concern to the interna
tional community. The overarching preeminence of maintaining peace and
security was left unaffected.
The story behind the inclusion of the term « justice » in article 2, para
graph 3, is closely tied to that of article 1(1). The former provision is the
statement of the Charter’s Principle on dispute settlement, and thus pro
vides an articulated standard for evaluating actions taken to peacefully
resolve international disputes. It is therefore understandable 2(3)’s develop
ment is connected with that of the Purpose provision it serves to flesh-out.
From ail indications, « justice » found its way into the terminology of
article 2, paragraph 3, as a deliberate attempt to limit the power of the
UN’s organs. Though as with article 1(1), the generative concem for the
check stemmed from a desire to foreclose the possibility of the international
organization engaging in Munich-like appeasement at the expense of small
states (54). There seems ample reason to accept the notion that 2(3) and
1(1) are to be understood as limitations on the Security Council’s power
nonetheless. Irrespective of the appréhensions precipitating efforts by draf
ters of an organic document to restrict the authorities conferred upon entities of power created, the restrictions fashioned remain restrictions capable
of affecting ail cases.

(51) See Doc. 742,1/1/23, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 318 (1945) ; Doc. 885,1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs.
393-95 (1945) ; Doc. 926, 1/1/36, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 422-23 (1945) ; Doc. 944, I/l/34/(l), 6
U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 453 (1945) ; Doc. 1179, 1/9(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. 245-46 (1945) ; Doc. 1187, 1/13, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 203 (1945).
(52) See e.g., Z e d a u s , «Protection of Nationals Abroad : Is Consent the Basis o f Légal Obli
gation ? d, 25 Texas Int’l L.J. 209, 233 (1990).
(53) See L. G o o d r i c h , E. H à m b r o , and A. S i m o n s , swpra note 14 at 28.
(54) Id. at 41.
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IV.
As alluded to above, article 24(1) provides the Security Council has the
« primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security. » (55) As just discussed, in carrying out its responsibility the Secu
rity Council’s duties must be discharged in accordance with Charter arti
cles 1 and 2, which limit the powers, possessed by the Council. The second
sentence of article 24(2), in referencing the specific chapters of the Charter
laying down the particular powers the Council has to discharge its duties
with regard to peace and security (56), implicates another source for questioning the propriety of establishing war claim resolution plans that do not
contain settlement based on violations of the rules of armed combat. The
reason this seems so is because nothing in the language of the individual
provisions of the relevant chapters referenced contain anything explicitly
indicating the Security Council operates without restriction.
The chapters most directly involved are V I and VII. Chapter VI essentially deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes. Pursuant to the system it creates, disputes likely to endanger international peace and secu
rity (57), or situations which might lead to international friction or give rise
to a dispute (58), trigger Security Council investigativé authority (59), and,
in the appropriate case, authority to call for settlement (60) or entertain
submissions from members or non-members of the United Nations (61).
Article 36 déclarés that disputes or situations likely to endanger internatio
nal security authorize the Council to recommend settlement procedures or
methods o f adjustment (62). Article 37 follows this by authorizing the
Council to recommend terms of settlement in a case where it has decided
a dispute referred to it by parties unable to develop their own resolution
is one that is in fact likely to endanger international peace and secu
rity (63). Chapter V II focuses on more exigent situations involving actual
or imminent ruptures of international peace. It empowers the Security
Council to make déterminations with regard to the existence of threats to
(55) See U.N. Charter, supra note 12, art. 24(1).
(56) Id., art. 24(2). The second sentence states : « The specific powers granted to the Security
Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and X II. »
(57) See id., art. 33(1).
(58) See id., art. 34.
(59) Id.
(60) See id., art. 33(2).
(61) See id., art. 35.
(62) See id., art. 36, providing in paragraph 1er :
The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33
[(likely to endanger international peace and security)] or of a situation of like nature recommend
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
(63) See id., art. 37(2) stating :
I f the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger
the maintenance o f international peace and security, it shall décidé whether to take action under
Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
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the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, and adopt recom
mendations or make décisions concerning measures to be taken to restore
peace and security (64). Such measures may consist of the use of armed
force (65) or devices short of such (66). Article 40 authorizes the Council to
prevent the aggravation of relevant situations by calling upon the parties
involved to comply with provisional measures pending the adoption of
Council recommendations or décisions (67).
The authority of the Security Council to make recommendations under
article 36 is not unlimited. By its very terms, it concerns only « procedures
or methods of adjustment. » (68) Thus, it would appear difficult to argue
that the reference to « appropriate » procedures or methods of adjustment
suggests an expansion of the Council’s substantive powers vesting it with
authority to act outside the purposes and principles of the Charter invoked
by the opening sentence of article 24, paragraph 2. Article 37 o f chapter VI
also references recommendations that are « appropriate. » (69) However, it
deals not with procédural matters, but the actual « terms of settlement » of
disputes addressed by the Security Council (70). This presents the possibi
lity of a construction expanding the Council’s substantive powers so as to
permit things like réparation schemes not dépendent on the laws o f war.
Indeed, the term « appropriate », itself is not used alone in 37, as in
article 36, but in the phrase « as it [the Council] may consider appro
priate, >>(71) further suggesting great breadth. The same kind of terminology appears in article 40, chapter VII, referencing provisional measures « it
[the Council] deems necessary or desirable. » (72) What makes it difficult to
accept that the language of either article 37 or article 40 empowers the
Council to act in a way envisioning the adoption of a war claims settlement
plan which sets controlling rules for prosecuting war to one side is the very
fact that article 24(2) unequivocally déclarés that the Council, in discharging its duties under chapters VI and VII, shall act in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the UN. Unless we ascribe more signifïcance to
open-ended references to « appropriate » and « necessary or desirable » than
we do to unequivocal déclarations, like that in 24(2), it would seem hard

(64) See id., art. 39.
(65) See id., art. 42.
(66) See id., art. 41.
(67) See id., art. 40 déclarés in part :
In order to prevent the aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making
the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the par
ties concemed to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.
(68) See supra note 62.
(69) See supra note 63.
(70) On the substantive nature of « terms of settlements » see, L. G o o d r i c h , E. H a m b r o , and
A. S i m o n s , supra note 14 at 284.
(71) See id.
(72) See supra note 67.
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to accept that the Council is not restricted by the international law of
armed warfare when devising a settlement plan.
Adding to the concern generated by the provision just looked at is the
fact that the Dumbarton Oaks proposai differed in regard to Charter chap
ters VI and V II in a couple of important respects. As observed above,
article 36 empowered the Council to recommend procédural stratégies for
resolving disputes, and 37 substantive settlements in the event the parties
were unable to successfully put such together. Article 40 dealt with provi
sional measures involving threats to or breaches of the peace. Chapter
VIII, section A, of the Dumbarton Oaks proposai contained a provision
replicating Charter article 36, but no parallel to article 37. Paragraph 5 of
section A authorized Council recommendations of « appropriate procedures
or methods of adjustment. » (73) Paragraph 4, however, predecessor to
article 37, simply provided that if the Security Council determined a dis
pute referred to it by the parties thereto was in fact likely to endanger
peace and security, then it was to décidé whether to take action under
paragraph 5. The Council was given no power to make recommendations on
substantive terms of settlement (74). Similarly, section B of chapter VIII
contained no grant of power to the Security Council to call upon parties to
a threat to or breach of the peace to follow certain provisional measures
directed at preventing aggravation of the extant situation. Basically, the
proposais contained in section B focused on Council déterminations, recom
mendations, and décisions regarding threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, or acts of aggression (75), and military and nonmilitary measures
necessary to maintain or restore peace and security (76).
The absence from the Dumbarton Oaks proposai of Security Council
authorization in regard to substantive terms of settlement and provisional
measures certainly supports the idea that the inclusion of such in the UN
Charter must be accorded significance. Two things, however, prove distur-

(73) See Dumbarton Oaks proposai, supra note 48 at 51, Chpt. VIII, sec. A, para. 5.
(74) See id., Chpt. VIII, sec. A, para. 4. To a large extent this may have reflected U .S . oppo
sition to having the Council serve as the « judge», rather than a «policeman», of international
peace and security. See L. G o o d r i c h , E. H a m b r o , and A. S e m o n s , supra note 14 at 284.
(75) See id., Chpt. VIII, sec. B, para. 2 reading :
2. In général the Security Council should determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach o f the peace or act of aggression and should make recommendations or décidé upon the
measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security.
(76) See id., at paras. 3 and 4 providing, respectively :
3. The Security Council should be empowered to determine what diplomatie, economic, or
other measures not involving the use of armed force should be employed to give effect to its déci
sions, and to call upon members of the Organization to apply such measures. Such measures may
include complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, télégraphie, radio and other
means o f communication and the severance of diplomatie and economic relations.
4. Should the Security Council consider such measures to be inadequate, it should be empowe
red to take such action by air, naval or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include démonstrations, blockade and other
opérations by air, sea or land forces of members of the Organization.
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bing about conceiving of this significance as an expansion of power which
allows the Council to adopt réparation systems ignoring the laws of armed
combat.
First, the inclusions contained in articles 37 and 40 on substantive terms
of settlement and provisional measures may be seen as directed simply at
giving the Council power in areas not addressed by the Dumbarton Oaks
proposai. They need not be viewed as suggestive of the manner in which
power possessed by the Council may be exercised. Evidence corroborating
this understanding can be gleaned especially from the records of the 1945
San Francisco Conference that relate to the adoption of article 40. As best
as can be determined, that provision found its way into the Charter as part
of the arrangement that led to the refusai to adopt paragraph 1, section B,
chapter V III of the Dumbarton Oaks proposai. That paragraph would have
allowed the Security Council to deem the failure of parties to settle a dis
pute likely to endanger international peace and security as a threat to the
peace, thereby activating Council powers to take diplomatie, economic, or
military measures (77). The delegates objected to Charter incorporation of
any such provision, while endorsing the inclusion of article 40’s power of
provisional measures (78). The idea could appear as one aimed predominantly at emphasizing the limits on the Council, yet accepting the reality that
action anticipating Council recommendations or décisions may be necessary
to prevent aggravation of tense international situations. This would suggest
the areas of power given the Council have been increased, but the Charter
restrictions on the exercise of that power remain intact.
Secondly, paragraph 1 of section B, chapter V III of the Dumbarton Oaks
proposai also provided in its final clause that measures taken thereunder
by the Security Council were to be « in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Organization. » (79) Despite the fact paragraph 1 was
never incorporated in the Charter, the Council would still seem subject to
limitations when acting under the authorities it possesses, since the fonda
mental reason for the paragraph’s rejection related to concern about the
Council deciding the failure of dispute settlement meant a threat to the
peace existed (80). Furthermore, both paragraph 3, section B, chapter VI of
the Dumbarton Oaks proposai (81) and article 24(2) of the Charter subject
(77) See para. 1, sec. B, Chapter VIII, stating :
Should the Security Council deem that a failure to settle a dispute in accordance with proce
dures indicated in paragraph 3 or Section A, or in accordance with its recommendations made
under paragraph 5 of Section A, constitutes a threat to the maintenance o f international peace
and security, it should take any measures necessary for the maintenance o f international peace
and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.
(78) See « Report of Rapporteur of Commission III, Committee III, on Chapter VIII, Section
B », Doc. 881, III/3/46 at 4-7, 12 U.N.C.I.O. 505-508 (1945).
(79) See supra note 77.
(80) S ee L. G o o d r i c h and A. S i m o n s , The United Nations and the Maintenance of Internatio
nal Peace and Security 368 (1955).
(81) See Dumbarton Oaks proposai, supra note 48, at paragraph 1, sec. B, Chpt. VI.
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the powers enumerated for peacefully settling disputes, and dealing with
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, to the
purposes and principles of the organization. Therefore, some of the opposi
tion at the San Francisco Conference to the final clause of paragraph 1 may
have been founded on little more than the fact that it was a redundant réi
tération (82). I f that is so, it hardly supports the argument that the elaborations on the Council’s powers under chapters VI and VII suggest the ability to act beyond the limits of Charter articles 1 and 2.

V.
Though the UN Charter appears to present some problems with concluding the Security Council has incontestable power to establish a war claims
settlement plan ignoring the laws of military engagement, what about
conceiving of the Resolutions establishing the plan as treaties between the
relevant parties ? As noted earlier, the accepted post-war practice of states
has involved réparation agreements that impose on the defeated nation(s)
an obligation to pay claims without regard to violations of the laws of war.
Thus, if the Résolutions concerning Iraq are seen as treaties, the fact they
fix liability for loss, damage, or injury simply because of the unlawful inva
sion and occupation is irrelevant. In any case, the recovery standard articulated by the Security Council for application by the Compensation Com
mission is perfectly consonant with governing norms.
Surely it is accurate to state that there is less than total agreement
among scholars and governments on the matter of the treaty-making capacity of international organizations. Thus, even leaving aside the issue of
whether Resolutions 674 and 687 are framed in a way satisfying expecta
tions about the form of an actual international agreement, there are some
who would insist that no international organization is capable of making
a binding treaty commitment with another (83), and others who would
conclude the exact opposite (84). Assuming the more libéral approach is
understood as the accurate position, it is one thing to argue that internatio
nal organizations have treaty-making capacity, and something entirely dif
ferent to argue the organization with which one is concerned has entered
into a treaty within the ambit of its compétence. In the context of the Uni
ted Nations Resolutions of concern here, this distinction between treatymaking capacity and compétence is essential. The same distinction exists
with regard to individual states as well. Though it is beyond doubt that

(82) See « Report o f Rapporteur », swpra note 78, Doc. 881, III/3/4 6 at 4, 12 U.N.C.I.O. 505
(1945).
(83) See I. B r o w n l i e , Principles of Public International Law 660-61 (1973).
(84) ] See F itzmaurice , « T he L aw and P rocedure of the I nternational Court of J us 
tice », [1953] Brit. Yb. In t’l L. 2.
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states possess the capacity to enter into treaties (85), questions may arise
concerning whether they are competent to draw on that capacity in particular instances (86).
The matter of competency, as it relates to individual states, has in large
measure been held to deal with situations in which it is « manifest » that
constitutional limits do not authorize the conclusion of particular treaty
commitment (87). As that same principle is applied to the United
Nations (88), it would necessitate examination of the provisions of the
Charter to ascertain the limits on the powers of the various organs which
might purport to act for it. As already discussed, there is much room for
suspecting the Security Council lacks the power to adopt Resolutions set
ting forth the type of réparation standard it has applied to Iraq in the
wake of the Gulf War. Whether the level of suspicion is substantial enough
to admit of the view it is « manifest » the Council has acted ultra vires is
an intriguing question. The typical notion is that it is the violation of a
constitutional or organic document that must be « manifest. » Yet it would
seem that such violations can be manifest not only when it is obviously
plain and clear no authority exists for the treaty entered into, but also
when it is just as plain and clear that serious réservations present themselves regarding the existence of needed authority (89). Were the former
alone to be considered as satisfying the test that a violation be « manifest, »
the only occasion on which the rule might apply would involve the extremely improbable case of a constitutional document explicitly reciting that
some specific treaty-making power is denied the body acting to exercise
such. Cases plainly raising genuine concéms about the possession of such a
power would be treated as those involving unequivocal constitutional lan
guage granting authority to make the treaty actually made. Silence alone
should not be taken as meaning that a « manifest » violation of a constitu
tional limitation is present. But there are certainly some situations when
it is so plain and clear serious questions exist with regard to the power to
make a particular treaty, that it would be inappropriate to conceive of the
(85) See e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiea, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONP. 39/27
(1969).
(86) See arts. 46 and 8.
(87) See id., art. 46. For cases of the Permanent Court o f International, Justice concluding the
limits were not « manifest », see Légal Status o f Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 53 at
71 (1933), and Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District o f Gex, P.G.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 46
(1932).
(88) On this principle being applied to international organizations, see UN Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between Internatio
nal Organizations, art. 46 (2)-(3), reprinted in 25 Int’l Leg. Mai. 543, 570 (1986).
(89) Thus, in commenting on the situation of the President’s power under the U.S. Constitu
tion to enter into international agreements, comment c, §311, Restatement (Revised) of the Law
of Foreign Relations of the United States (1986), indicates that, despite the général uncertainty
surrounding the extent of the power, « some agreements ... are of sufficiënt formality, dignity and
importance that in the unlikely event of the President’s attempting to make such an agreement
on his own authority his lack of authority might be regarded as ‘ mànifest’ ».
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absence of language of express déniai as tantamount to that of express
grant.
As to the matter of Iraq raising the claim of the Security Council exceeding its powers, problems certainly exist. International law would support
such a claim raised by the United Nations itself (90). The rationale being
that the absence of compétence to enter into the commitment vitiates the
consent given thereto. Governing légal principles, however, say nothing
about the claim of ultra vires being raised by states situated like Iraq —
states signing on to an international agreement with another entity which
has exceeded its powers in entering the commitment (91). One might suggest the rationale for depriving these states of the opportunity to raise the
claim dérivés from the unclean hands had in entering a commitment with
another entity « manifestly » lacking the power to enter such, then later
attempting to escape from the commitment’s obligations when it appears
agreement had been ill-considered and too hastily undertaken. It seems
that equally convincing reasons exist, however, for reaching the exact
opposite conclusion. Specifically, since no one is likely to understand the
ambiguities of a particular constitutional document better than the entity
operating under it, commitments taken on by that entity should not later
be subject to avoidance by it when the unwise or burdensome nature o f the
commitments becomes apparent. To allow such promotes extravagant
claims to treaty-making power, because states assiduously acting within
their power cannot raise objections to the validity of commitments made
by others who do not follow such a disciplined approach, and those who
claim power they do not possess can décidé to observe commitments that
tum out to be bénéficiai and escape those that prove onerous. Furthermore, in order to encourage the negotiation and making of treaties that are
within the constitutional power of the parties involved, the party that is
not suspected of exceeding its authority should have the opportunity to
contest, if needed, the validity of a treaty on the grounds that the other
party committed has exceeded its own constitutional power. By recognizing
the existence of such an opportunity, international law discourages parties
inclined to push the limits of their power from shopping for agreements
that prove advantageous and abandoning those that do not.
Without attempting to prejudge the situation conceming Iraq, what has
been said suggests the possibility it could appropriately question the argu
ment that the Security Council Résolutions addressing Gulf War compensa
tion can be viewed as tantamount to treaty commitments. Though it grudgingly accepted the Resolutions (92), problems exist with regard to whether

(90) See Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 46(2).
(91) Id.
(92) See « War in Persian Gulf Ends ; Iraq Accepta U.N. Cease-Fire Demand for Réparations,
But Calls Council ‘ Unjust’ », U.N. Chronicle, June 1991, at 6 (Resolution 687).
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the Council exceeded its power in a « manifest » way, and whether Iraq, as
well as the United Nations, is capable of raising such a challenge. These are
difficult and complex matters. What is straightforward and crystal clear,
however, is that one should be incredibly reluctant to simply accept bald
statements about Iraq’s Gulf War liability being determined by nothing
more than the fact its invasion and occupation of Kuwait were illégal.

